Recent Decisions Provide Some Clarity on How Courts and Government Agencies Will Likely Resolve Issues Involving Standard-Essential Patents by Amundson, Steven M.
Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
Volume 13 Issue 1 Article 4 
9-1-2013 
Recent Decisions Provide Some Clarity on How Courts and 
Government Agencies Will Likely Resolve Issues Involving 
Standard-Essential Patents 
Steven M. Amundson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Steven M. Amundson, Recent Decisions Provide Some Clarity on How Courts and Government Agencies 
Will Likely Resolve Issues Involving Standard-Essential Patents, 13 Chi. -Kent J. Intell. Prop. 91 (2013). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol13/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of 




RECENT DECISIONS PROVIDE SOME CLARITY ON 
HOW COURTS AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
WILL LIKELY RESOLVE ISSUES INVOLVING 
STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS 
 
Steven M. Amundson* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“Telephones talk to each other, the Internet works, and hairdryers plug 
into electrical sockets because private groups have set ‘interface’ standards, 
allowing compatibility between products made by different manufacturers.”1 By 
allowing compatibility, standards reduce or eliminate costs for consumers who 
switch between different manufacturers’ products.2 Standards also increase 
manufacturing volumes and promote price competition.3 In the United States, 
there are about 50,000 standards developed by over 600 private-sector industry 
groups.4 
Industry groups that negotiate and agree upon technical standards to 
ensure the compatibility of different manufacturers’ products are called 
standard-setting organizations (or SSOs). Through member consensus, SSOs 
typically choose the technology to include in a standard from among competing 
technologies. “[V]oluntary consensus standards, whether mechanical, electrical, 
computer-related, or communications-related, have incorporated important 
  
 * Copyright © 2014 Steven M. Amundson. Steven M. Amundson is a partner in the 
New York office of Frommer Lawrence & Haug LLP and head of the firm’s appellate 
practice group. The views expressed in this Article do not necessarily reflect those of the 
firm or its clients. 
 1 Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights & Standard-Setting Organizations, 
90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1893 (2002). 
 2 Standard Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3–4 (2013) (statement of Suzanne Munck, Chief Counsel for 
Intellectual Property, Federal Trade Commission), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2013/07/prepared-statement-federal-trade-
commission-concerning-standard-essential. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See Am. Nat’l Standards Inst., Overview of the U.S. Standardization System, 
STANDARDSPORTAL.ORG, http://www.standardsportal.org/usa_en/standards_system.aspx 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2013). 
 




technical advances that are fundamental to the interoperability of many of the 
products on which consumers have come to rely.”5 
This Article discusses recent decisions by courts and government 
agencies in patent-infringement cases involving standards. And it includes 
points to consider when litigating those cases, such as potential pitfalls when 
making license offers or seeking court action. 
In the following sections, this Article explains how SSOs typically deal 
with patents related to standards. It then outlines issues arising from such 
patents. After that, this Article describes how courts have determined royalty 
rates for such patents, what makes a patent or a patent claim essential to a 
standard, and the positions of various courts and government agencies regarding 
the availability of injunctive relief. 
I. STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS 
Implementing a standard may require use of patented technology.6 Where 
a standard requires use of patented technology, the patent is called an “essential” 
patent or a standard-essential patent.7 
An owner of a standard-essential patent may gain market power and 
exploit that advantage by (1) employing the patent to exclude competitors or (2) 
seeking higher royalties than implementers would have paid before standard 
adoption when alternatives to the patented technology could have been selected.8 
This exploitation is termed patent hold-up.9 Patent hold-up can undermine the 
standard-setting process, discourage innovation as well as standard adoption, 
and cause consumers to pay excessive prices.10 Excessive prices can impose an 
anticompetitive tax on new products incorporating the patented technology, thus 
impeding instead of promoting innovation.11 
  
 5 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT 
ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND 
COMMITMENTS 3–4 (Jan. 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/offices/ogc/Final_DOJ-PTO_Policy_Statement_on_FRAND 
_SEPs_1-8-13.pdf [hereinafter DOJ-PTO POLICY]. 
 6 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067 (W.D. Wis. 
2012). 
 7 Id. 
 8 DOJ-PTO POLICY, supra note 5, at 4. 
 9 See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents & Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 
603, 603–04 (2007); see also Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310–14 
(3d Cir. 2007). 
 10 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 10-1823, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10–11 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). 
 11 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup & Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
Rev. 1991, 1993 (2007). 
 





To reduce the potential for abuse, SSOs typically have rules for the 
participants in the standard-setting process that require the participants to state 
before standard adoption whether they own any patents necessarily infringed by 
someone implementing the prospective standard.12 Those rules usually require 
that owners of standard-essential patents agree to (1) grant royalty-free licenses 
to those who implement the standard or (2) grant licenses under reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms or fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory 
(FRAND) terms.13 One federal judge has noted that “the word ‘fair’ adds 
nothing to ‘reasonable’ and ‘nondiscriminatory.’”14 The acronym RAND 
predominates in the United States, while the acronym FRAND predominates 
elsewhere.15 
If an owner of a standard-essential patent does not agree to grant a 
royalty-free license or one on RAND terms, the SSO can revise the proposed 
standard to design around or avoid the patent. 
An owner of a standard-essential patent may agree to grant a royalty-free 
license to create a market for its product that would not exist absent adoption of 
a particular standard. Or it may also own patents covering preferable, but 
nonessential, aspects of standard implementation, and thus expect royalties 
based on those related but nonessential patents. 
When an a owner of a standard-essential patent commits to licensing on 
RAND terms, it does so for the intended benefit of the SSOs’ members as well 
as others who implement the standard, and both the members and implementers 
are third-party beneficiaries with rights to sue for breach of the patentee’s 
commitment.16 An owner of a standard-essential patent who commits to 
licensing on RAND terms does not have to specify those terms before the SSO 
adopts the standard.17 Hence, disputes can arise at the time of licensing about 
what are and are not RAND terms. SSOs typically have policies preventing 
them from assisting in determining RAND terms and resolving issues between 
  
 12 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1067; see Microsoft 
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 13 See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1067; Vizio, 
Inc. v. Funai Elec. Co., No. 09-0174, 2010 WL 7762624, at *1 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 
2010); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 WL 2111217, at *6; Barnes & 
Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., 849 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931–37 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 14 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 912 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Posner, J., 
sitting by designation); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 WL 2111217, at 
*12. 
 15 See DOJ-PTO POLICY, supra note 5, at 1 n.2. 
 16 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d at 884–85; Realtek 
Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. 12-3451, 2013 WL 2181717, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
May 20, 2013); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1083–85, 
1087; Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1030–33 (W.D. Wash. 
2012). 
 17 See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d at 876–77. 
 




patentees and implementers.18 Thus, if a dispute arises and the parties cannot 
resolve it on their own, a courthouse may provide the only forum for its 
resolution. 
II. ISSUES ARISING FROM STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS 
Disputes between patentees and implementers may present many issues: 
How do the Georgia-Pacific factors, typically considered in patent cases when 
determining a reasonable royalty, apply to a RAND commitment?19 Can a 
patentee provide a volume discount, e.g., seek a higher royalty from 
implementer A who produces 1,000 units per year and a lower royalty from 
implementer B who produces 50,000 units per year? If the licensee also owns 
patents, can an owner of standard-essential patents account for patents licensed 
to it by the licensee (called a cross license), e.g., seek a higher royalty from 
implementer C who will not cross-license patents and a lower royalty from 
implementer D who will cross license patents? How can a patentee price a 
standard-essential patent when licensed along with nonessential patents? If 
multiple entities own multiple patents covering a single standard, how can one 
entity price its standard-essential patent to permit the other entities to receive 
reasonable royalties (called royalty stacking)? In the event of litigation, what 
relief can an implementer obtain, and can a patentee obtain injunctive relief for a 
RAND-encumbered patent? Can a purchaser of a RAND-encumbered patent 
disavow a seller’s RAND commitment? Do a seller’s deceitful acts vis-à-vis an 
SSO extend to a purchaser of a RAND-encumbered patent such that an 
implementer may rely on those deceitful acts as a defense in an infringement 
action brought by the purchaser? 
Recent decisions in cases concerning cell phones and other wireless 
devices shed light on some of these issues as well as others involving standard-
essential patents. 
  
 18 See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1084–85. 
 19 In Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., the district court 
compiled a list from what it called a “conspectus of the leading cases” of fifteen factors 
generally relevant when determining a reasonable royalty for a patent license. 318 F. 
Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). 
Those factors include royalties paid by others under the patent in suit, royalties paid by 
the licensee under comparable patents, the nature and scope of the license, e.g., exclusive 
or nonexclusive, the patentee’s established policy of licensing or not licensing its patents, 
the relationship between the parties, e.g., whether they compete directly against each 
other, and the profitability of products made under the patent in suit. Id. The Federal 
Circuit has approved use of the Georgia-Pacific factors when determining a reasonable 
royalty. See, e.g., Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 26–27 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012); Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996); SmithKline 
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 





A. How to Determine a RAND Royalty Rate 
In Microsoft v. Motorola, a district court in Seattle provided a framework 
for determining a RAND royalty rate.20 The dispute in that case involved two 
standards: (1) International Telecommunication Union (ITU) standard H.264 for 
video coding, and (2) Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
standard 802.11 for wireless local area networking (WLAN, commonly called 
Wi-Fi).21 For each of those standards, Motorola owned a portfolio of essential 
patents and committed to license those patents on RAND terms.22 
Motorola alleged that several Microsoft products, including Windows and 
the Xbox, employed the H.264 standard and that the Xbox employed the 802.11 
standard.23 Motorola offered to license the 802.11 standard-essential patents for 
2.25% of the end-product price.24 Motorola also offered to license the H.264 
standard-essential patents for 2.25% of the end-product price.25 Soon after 
receiving those offers, Microsoft sued Motorola for breach of contract, claiming 
that Motorola breached its RAND commitments to the IEEE and the ITU by 
making unreasonable offers.26 
The district court decided that Motorola’s RAND commitments to the 
IEEE and the ITU created enforceable contracts between Motorola and the 
respective SSOs.27 The court also decided that implementers of the respective 
standards were third-party beneficiaries who could sue for breach of Motorola’s 
RAND commitments.28 To permit a jury to determine whether Motorola’s offers 
to Microsoft breached Motorola’s obligations to license on RAND terms, the 
court conducted a bench trial before a jury trial to establish RAND royalty rates 
for Motorola’s two groups of standard-essential patents.29 Because RAND terms 
could conceivably encompass more than one rate, the court established RAND 
royalty ranges so that a jury in a subsequent trial could compare Motorola’s 
offers with those ranges.30 
In particular, the district court ruled that (1) the RAND rate for the 802.11 
standard-essential patents ranged from 0.8 to 19.5 cents per unit and (2) the 
  
 20 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 10-1823, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10–20 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). 
 21 Id. at *1. 
 22 Id. at *1, *21, *27, *53. 
 23 Id. at *42, *54. 
 24 Id. at *2. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 10-1823, 2012 WL 5993202, at *4 (W.D. 
Wash. Nov. 30, 2012). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 WL 2111217, at *1–3; Microsoft Corp. v. 
Motorola, Inc., 2012 WL 5993202, at *4–5. 
 30 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 WL 2111217, at *3. 
 




RAND rate for the H.264 standard-essential patents ranged from 0.555 to 16.389 
cents per unit.31 Thus, in a subsequent trial, a jury will use those ranges to 
evaluate the reasonableness of Motorola’s license offers to Microsoft when 
deciding whether Motorola breached its RAND commitments. 
In addition, the district court determined Motorola’s damages for patent 
infringement by establishing particular RAND rates for the products at issue, 
i.e., 3.471 cents per unit for the 802.11 standard-essential patents and 0.555 
cents per unit for the H.264 standard-essential patents.32 Commentators have 
estimated that those royalties translate into about $1.8 million in annual 
payments, a vastly lower amount than the $4 billion in annual payments that 
Motorola wanted.33 
In determining RAND royalty rates for Motorola’s standard-essential 
patents, the district court adopted “a modified version of the Georgia-Pacific 
factors to recreate a hypothetical negotiation between the parties.”34 Among 
other things, the court evaluated (1) the importance of the patents to the standard 
at issue and (2) the importance of the standard and the patents to the products at 
issue.35 According to the court, a RAND royalty rate should reflect “the 
contribution of the patented technology to the capabilities of the standard, and in 
turn, the contribution of those capabilities of the standard to the implementer 
and the implementer’s products.”36 
Also, because industry standards like the ones at issue can require the use 
of “hundreds or thousands” of patents owned by numerous entities, the district 
court considered royalty stacking and “the need to ensure that the aggregate 
royalties associated with a given standard are reasonable.”37 
The district court decided that the proper method for determining a 
RAND royalty rate for a standard-essential patent should minimize the risk of 
patent hold-up and therefore assess patent value just before standard adoption.38 
At that point, the standard presumably could have employed alternatives to the 
patented technology.39 So an assessment at that point limits the royalty to the 
  
 31 Id. at *4, *85–87, *100–01. 
 32 Id. at *4, *16–17, *85–86, *99–100. 
 33 See, e.g., Janet I. Tu, Microsoft and Motorola Return to Court for More Patent 
Battling, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 26, 2013, 6:15 AM), 
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/microsoftpri0/2013/08/26/microsoft-and-motorola-return-
to-court-for-more-patent-battling/. 
 34 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 WL 2111217, at *3, *16–20. 
 35 Id. at *3, *19–20. 
 36 Id. at *20. 
 37 Id. at *11; see id. at *12. 
 38 Id. at *12, *19; see also SK hynix Inc. v. Rambus Inc., No. 00-20905, 2013 WL 
1915865, at *19 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2013); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 
901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 39 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 WL 2111217, at *19; see also Apple, Inc. 
v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 913. 
 





value of the patent itself rather than the value conferred once the patent becomes 
essential, i.e., the hold-up value.40 As another court has observed, once the 
patent becomes essential, “the patentee’s bargaining power surges because a 
prospective licensee has no alternative to licensing the patent.”41 
After a jury trial in Microsoft v. Motorola, the jury found that Motorola 
breached its RAND commitments and returned a verdict for Microsoft.42 The 
jury awarded damages of about $11.5 million to compensate Microsoft for 
relocating a distribution center out of Germany.43 And based on the finding that 
Motorola violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing, the jury awarded 
damages of about $3 million to compensate Microsoft for attorney fees and 
litigation costs.44 
The jury’s decision should send a clear message to owners of standard-
essential patents that an initial license offer should propose a reasonable rate. A 
patentee may want to document the process employed to determine the rate in an 
initial license offer to use defensively if an implementer files a breach-of-
contract action. 
Regarding the method for determining a RAND royalty rate, in SK hynix 
v. Rambus, a district court in San Jose agreed with the court in Microsoft v. 
Motorola that the method should minimize the risk of patent hold-up and 
therefore assess patent value just before standard adoption.45 In SK hynix, the 
patentee, Rambus, willfully destroyed numerous documents when litigation was 
reasonably foreseeable.46 Accordingly, the court decided to sanction Rambus by 
limiting it to a RAND royalty because the court believed that a RAND royalty 
would not disadvantage the infringer Hynix vis-à-vis its competitors.47 The 
parties then briefed the RAND issues for the 1995-1996 timeframe, i.e., the 
period just before standard adoption.48 After briefing, however, the court 
concluded that the actual royalty rates negotiated and paid by Hynix’s 
competitors after 2000 constituted “a more appropriate and straightforward way 
to mitigate the prejudice” to Hynix caused by Rambus’s spoliation.”49 Although 
those actual royalty rates were reached after litigation, the court decided to use 
  
 40 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 WL 2111217, at *12, *19; see also SK 
hynix, 2013 WL 1915865, at *19; Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 913. 
 41 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 913. 
 42 Verdict Form at 2–3, Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 10-1823 (W.D. Wash. 
Sept. 4, 2013), ECF No. 909. 
 43 Id. at 2. 
 44 Id. at 2–3. 
 45 SK hynix, 2013 WL 1915865, at *19. 
 46 Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 939, 985 (N.D. Cal. 
2012); SK hynix, 2013 WL 1915865, at *19. 
 47 Hynix Semiconductor, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 986–87; SK hynix, 2013 WL 1915865, at 
*1, *20. 
 48 SK hynix, 2013 WL 1915865, at *20. 
 49 Id. 
 




them in sanctioning Rambus because they were negotiated “after Rambus’s 
misconduct was disclosed” and therefore reflected Rambus’s spoliation.50 In 
contrast to those actual royalty rates, the court decided that a RAND royalty 
would amount to “a non-competitive rate” and cause “significant prejudice” to 
Hynix.51 
Consequently, the district court’s statements about the proper method for 
determining a RAND royalty rate constitute dicta. Still, the decision in SK hynix 
evidences an emerging consensus concerning the proper method for determining 
a RAND royalty rate. Further, the court in SK hynix noted that the use of royalty 
rates negotiated to settle litigation may run afoul of decisions disapproving the 
use of settlement agreements to establish reasonable-royalty damages.52 But the 
court distinguished those decisions because it used the actual royalty rates 
negotiated and paid by Hynix’s competitors to fashion an appropriate sanction 
rather than determine Rambus’s damages.53 
B. A Court May Decline to Determine RAND Terms Unless the Licensee Agrees 
to Accept Them Without Qualification 
In Microsoft v. Motorola, Microsoft represented to the district court that it 
would accept a license to Motorola’s standard-essential patents on RAND 
terms.54 In another case involving Motorola’s standard-essential patents, Apple 
stated that it would not necessarily accept a license on court-determined RAND 
terms.55 In Apple v. Motorola, Apple asserted a breach-of-contract claim, among 
others, based on Motorola’s alleged breach of its RAND commitments.56 Only 
shortly before trial did it become clear to the district court that Apple would not 
commit to be bound by a court-determined RAND rate.57 Instead, Apple sought 
“only a ceiling on the potential license rate that it could use for negotiating 
purposes” with Motorola.58 The court concluded that the relief sought by Apple 
  
 50 Id. at *20–21. 
 51 Id. at *20. 
 52 Id. at *21 (citing LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 77 
(Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 10-1823, 2012 WL 4827743, at *8 (W.D. 
Wash. Oct. 10, 2012). 
 55 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-178, 2012 WL 7989412, at *2–3 
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 8, 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-178, 2012 WL 
5416931, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2012). 
 56 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 2012 WL 7989412, at *1; Apple, Inc. v. 
Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1066 (W.D. Wis. 2012). 
 57 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 2012 WL 7989412, at *2–3; Apple, Inc. v. 
Motorola Mobility, Inc., 2012 WL 5416931, at *1. 
 58 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 2012 WL 7989412, at *3; see Apple, Inc. v. 
Motorola Mobility, Inc., 2012 WL 5416931, at *1. 
 





would not resolve the dispute and have no practical effect.59 Hence, the court 
dismissed Apple’s breach-of-contract claim without prejudice.60 So Apple v. 
Motorola demonstrates the danger if a party declines to commit to be bound by a 
court-determined RAND rate. 
C. What Makes a Patent or a Patent Claim Essential to a Standard 
Providing further clarity to the law concerning RAND obligations, a 
district court in Chicago addressed issues involving essentiality to a standard, in 
particular, IEEE standard 802.11.61 In that case, Innovatio owned more than 
twenty patents allegedly covering wireless internet access.62 It asserted those 
patents against numerous stores, restaurants, hotels, and other commercial users 
of wireless internet technology located throughout the United States.63 After 
various manufacturers of allegedly infringing devices filed an action against 
Innovatio seeking declarations of noninfringement and invalidity, Innovatio 
asserted a counterclaim against the manufacturers for infringement.64 
The parties disputed whether all of the asserted patent claims were 
essential to IEEE standard 802.11, and thus whether the RAND commitments by 
Innovatio’s predecessors in interest applied to all of the asserted patent claims or 
just some of them.65 Presumably, Innovatio could request higher royalties or 
injunctive relief for infringement of nonessential patent claims. 
The parties agreed that the RAND commitments by Innovatio’s 
predecessors bound Innovatio, and that the IEEE bylaws defined the extent of 
those commitments.66 But the parties disagreed as to who had the burden to 
prove essentiality to the standard.67 The district court analogized the existence of 
a RAND obligation to the existence of a license.68 Because a patent challenger in 
a typical patent case has the burden of establishing a license—an affirmative 
defense to infringement—the court decided that the alleged infringers had the 
burden of establishing a RAND obligation.69 Additionally, because the IEEE 
bylaws contemplate standard-essential patents containing both essential and 
  
 59 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 2012 WL 7989412, at *5; Apple, Inc. v. 
Motorola Mobility, Inc., 2012 WL 5416931, at *3. 
 60 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-178, 2012 WL 5943791, at *2–3 
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 28, 2012). 
 61 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11-9308, 2013 WL 3874042 
(N.D. Ill. July 26, 2013). 
 62 Id. at *1. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at *2. 
 66 Id. at *4–5, 7. 
 67 Id. at *7. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (identifying “license” as an affirmative defense). 
 




nonessential claims, and because each patent claim constitutes a separate 
invention, the court decided to address essentiality on a claim-by-claim basis 
rather than on a patent-by-patent basis.70 
In answering the question what makes a patent claim essential to IEEE 
standard 802.11, the district court analyzed the paragraph in the IEEE bylaws 
defining “Essential Patent Claim.”71 According to the court, that definition 
provides a two-part test for determining essentiality: “(1) at the time of the 
standard’s adoption, the only commercially and technically feasible way to 
implement a particular mandatory or optional portion of . . . the standard was to 
infringe the patent claim; and (2) the patent claim includes, at least in part, 
technology that is explicitly required by or expressly set forth in the standard 
. . . .”72 The court then considered the disputed patent claims and decided that all 
were essential to the standard.73 
The district court’s test for determining essentiality comports with a test 
that the Federal Circuit employed in an analogous context. In a case involving 
compact discs and a Recordable CD Standard that two industry participants 
prepared, the Federal Circuit considered a patent essential to the standard if it 
was “reasonably necessary” to practice the patent when implementing the 
standard due to the absence of “commercially practicable” alternatives.74 
In In re Innovatio, the district court addressed only IEEE standard 
802.11.75 But its analytical framework of looking to the IEEE bylaws could 
apply to other standards based on RAND commitments to other SSOs. Thus, in 
answering the essentiality question for a different standard from a different SSO, 
a court could analyze that SSO’s policies just as the district court in Chicago 
analyzed the IEEE’s policies. 
After a bench trial in In re Innovatio, the district court set the RAND rate 
for the 802.11 standard-essential patents at 9.56 cents per unit.76 The court based 
that royalty on the $14.85 average price of the Wi-Fi chip embedded in each 
product and rejected Innovatio’s request for royalties based on end-product 
price.77 Innovatio’s request would have resulted in royalties ranging from $4.72 
per unit for a laptop computer to $16.17 per unit for a tablet computer to $36.90 
  
 70 In re Innovatio, 2013 WL 3874042, at *7–8. 
 71 Id. at *8–10. 
 72 Id. at *10. 
 73 Id. at *13–27. 
 74 Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 563 F.3d 1301, 1303, 1310–11 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (citing Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2008)), 
vacated, 583 F.3d 1380, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009); U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1182, 1194–95 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 75 In re Innovatio, 2013 WL 3874042, at *7–10. 
 76 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11-9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at 
*3–4, *84–86, *88 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013). 
 77 Id. at *21–34, *77–82. 
 





per unit for a bar-code scanner.78 The court reasoned that basing the RAND rate 
on the average price of the Wi-Fi chip best served the rate’s nondiscriminatory 
objective because it prevented Innovatio from discriminating “between licensees 
on the basis of their position in the market.”79 
Notably, the district court considered royalty stacking and compared the 
RAND rate for Innovatio’s 802.11 standard-essential patents to the RAND rate 
for Motorola’s 802.11 standard-essential patents that the Seattle court 
determined in Microsoft v. Motorola.80 The Chicago court viewed the 9.56-cent 
rate as “comfortably within” the 0.8 to 19.5 cents range set by the Seattle court.81 
As for the 3.471-cent rate used by the Seattle court to calculate Motorola’s 
damages for patent infringement, the Chicago court found that Innovatio’s 
patents had “moderate to moderate-high importance to the standard” but that 
Motorola’s patents had “minimal value to the standard.”82 Thus, the Chicago 
court reasoned that a multiplier of about three appropriately accounted for the 
greater importance of Innovatio’s patents to the standard.83 
D. The Unavailability of Injunctive Relief as a Remedy for Infringement 
With regard to the relief available in the event of litigation, several courts 
have concluded that a patentee’s commitment to license a standard-essential 
patent on RAND terms conflicts with a request for injunctive relief that would 
prohibit use of the patent. By agreeing to license the standard-essential patent on 
RAND terms, the patentee voluntarily relinquishes the right to exclude in 
exchange for having the patented technology included in the standard.84 
Various decisions in the Microsoft v. Motorola case discussed above 
illustrate the analysis. There, Microsoft filed a breach-of-contract action in the 
Seattle court based on Motorola’s alleged breach of its RAND commitments, 
and then Motorola sued Microsoft for patent infringement in a different district 
court.85 The cases were consolidated in the Seattle court.86 Motorola sued 
Microsoft in Germany as well as the United States, asserting standard-essential 
patents in both countries.87 In Germany, Motorola requested injunctive relief 
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prohibiting Microsoft from selling allegedly infringing products in Germany.88 
German law does not recognize third-party contractual rights.89 So in Germany, 
Microsoft could not defeat Motorola’s request for injunctive relief by asserting 
that Motorola’s RAND commitments entitled Microsoft to a license. 
Consequently, Microsoft asked the Seattle court to issue a preliminary 
injunction preventing Motorola from enforcing any injunctive relief obtained 
from the German court.90 
In evaluating Microsoft’s preliminary-injunction motion, the court 
considered the following four factors: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) 
irreparable harm absent the requested injunction; (3) the balance of hardships; 
and (4) the public interest.91 The court noted that where the injunction would 
prevent a party from litigating a similar claim in a foreign court, certain anti-
suit-injunction factors replace the likelihood-of-success factor, in particular: 
(1) whether or not the parties and the issues are the same, and whether or 
not the first action is dispositive of the action to be enjoined; (2) whether 
the foreign litigation would frustrate a policy of the forum issuing the 
injunction; and (3) whether the impact on comity would be tolerable.92 
The court found that the anti-suit-injunction factors and the preliminary-
injunction factors favored an order barring Motorola from enforcing any 
injunctive relief obtained from the German court.93 For instance, the court 
determined that the Microsoft-requested anti-suit injunction would serve the 
public interest by “ensuring standard essential patents are accessible to all 
comers under RAND terms” and “permitting Microsoft’s customers, who rely 
on Microsoft’s information technology services, to conduct business 
uninterrupted.”94 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the anti-suit injunction under the 
abuse-of-discretion standard.95 In doing so, the appellate court said that 
“injunctive relief against infringement is arguably a remedy inconsistent with 
the licensing commitment.”96 And the appellate court decided that (1) a 
patentee’s commitment to license a standard-essential patent on RAND terms 
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creates a contract governing the patentee’s ability to enforce the patent and (2) a 
third-party beneficiary can sue for a breach of that contract.97 
About two months after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the district court 
determined that Motorola could not obtain any form of injunctive relief for its 
standard-essential patents in any country.98 The court noted that a patentee must 
establish irreparable harm and the inadequacy of legal remedies to obtain 
injunctive relief.99 The court then concluded that Motorola could not establish 
irreparable harm because: (1) Microsoft was entitled to license Motorola’s 
standard-essential patents on RAND terms; (2) Microsoft agreed to accept a 
license on RAND terms; (3) a license agreement will become a reality at some 
point; and (4) Microsoft’s royalty payments under that agreement will constitute 
Motorola’s remedy for infringement.100 Because that remedy “will make 
Motorola whole,” the court ruled that Motorola had an adequate legal remedy 
for Microsoft’s use of Motorola’s standard-essential patents.101 
Similarly, in Barnes & Noble v. LSI, a district court in San Francisco 
concluded that a patentee’s RAND commitment rendered injunctive relief 
unavailable as a remedy for infringement of a standard-essential patent.102 
Additionally, in Realtek v. LSI, a district court in San Jose considered the 
propriety of injunctive relief as a remedy for infringement of a standard-
essential patent and reached the same conclusion.103 In Realtek, LSI’s subsidiary, 
Agere, owned two patents designated as essential to IEEE standard 802.11.104 
Realtek, a Taiwanese corporation, supplied integrated circuits to customers in 
the United States for use in products practicing that standard.105 In late 2002, 
Agere offered to license its 802.11 standard-essential patents to Realtek for five 
percent of Realtek’s selling price.106 In response, Realtek asked for more 
information about Agere’s infringement contentions.107 But the parties ceased 
communications in early 2003 with no resolution of the licensing or 
infringement issues.108 
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Years later, in early 2012, LSI contacted Realtek and asserted that 
Realtek’s integrated circuits as incorporated into certain third-party products 
infringed its 802.11 standard-essential patents.109 LSI asked Realtek to 
immediately stop the allegedly infringing activities.110 Less than a week later, 
LSI filed a complaint with the International Trade Commission (ITC) under 
section 337 of the 1930 Tariff Act, which makes patent infringement an unfair 
trade practice.111 LSI requested injunctive relief from the ITC, e.g., an order 
excluding the accused products from entry into the United States.112 Shortly after 
that, Realtek requested that LSI license the two patents at issue on RAND 
terms.113 LSI responded with a proposed license.114 Realtek then sued LSI for, 
among other things, breach of contract.115 According to Realtek, the proposed 
license unreasonably provided for royalties that exceeded Realtek’s selling price 
because the license based royalties on end-product pricing rather than the value 
of the Realtek-supplied components.116 
Realtek requested a partial summary judgment on its breach-of-contract 
claim based on the contention that LSI’s initiation of the ITC proceeding before 
offering a license, by itself, breached LSI’s obligation to license on RAND 
terms.117 Realtek asserted that seeking injunctive relief in an ITC proceeding “is 
inherently inconsistent with a patent holder’s RAND obligations.”118 In light of 
that assertion, Realtek requested a preliminary injunction preventing LSI from 
enforcing any injunctive relief obtained from the ITC until after the district court 
determined RAND terms for LSI’s standard-essential patents.119 
The district court agreed with Realtek that LSI breached its obligation to 
license on RAND terms “by seeking injunctive relief against Realtek before 
offering Realtek a license.”120 The court concluded that seeking injunctive relief 
before offering a license “is inherently inconsistent and a breach of defendants’ 
promise to license the patents on RAND terms.”121 The court reasoned that by 
“promising to license on RAND terms,” a patentee admits that “monetary 
damages, namely a RAND royalty, would be adequate compensation for any 
injury it has suffered as a result of . . . allegedly infringing conduct.”122 The 
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court also reasoned that the pending threat of injunctive relief gives the patentee 
“inherent bargaining power in any RAND licensing negotiation.”123 
In evaluating Realtek’s request for a preliminary injunction, the district 
court considered the following four factors: (1) likelihood of success on the 
merits; (2) irreparable harm absent the requested injunction; (3) the balance of 
hardships; and (4) the public interest.124 The court concluded that each factor 
favored an order barring LSI from enforcing any injunctive relief obtained from 
the ITC.125 For instance, the court determined that the Realtek-requested 
injunction barring LSI would serve the public interest by making clear that 
“commitments to make patents available on reasonable terms matter.”126 
Consistent with the district court rulings discussed above, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) has contended that seeking injunctive relief against a 
willing licensee of a RAND-encumbered patent constitutes an unfair method of 
competition.127 In particular, the FTC maintained that Google and its predecessor 
Motorola violated RAND commitments by (1) asserting standard-essential 
patents against Apple and Microsoft in various district courts as well as the ITC 
and (2) seeking injunctive relief.128 The FTC claimed that this conduct likely 
limited competing products, increased costs for consumers and competitors, 
undermined the standard-setting process, and therefore violated section 5 of the 
FTC Act.129 That statute authorizes the FTC to prohibit unfair methods of 
competition.130 
To resolve the FTC proceeding, Google agreed to a consent order that 
requires it to abide by its RAND commitments.131 When Google alleges 
infringement of RAND-encumbered patents, the consent order generally 
prohibits Google from enforcing injunctive relief in pending cases and seeking 
injunctive relief in future cases.132 But Google may request injunctive relief as a 
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remedy for infringement in narrow circumstances, e.g., if no district court in the 
United States can exercise jurisdiction over the potential licensee, if the potential 
licensee has refused to accept a license on RAND terms as determined by a 
court or through arbitration, or if the potential licensee has stated that it will not 
agree to a license on any terms.133 
According to the consent order, Google must provide a potential licensee 
with a written offer to license containing all material terms for the standard-
essential patents at issue.134 If the parties cannot agree on terms, the potential 
licensee may have any contested terms determined by a court or through binding 
arbitration.135 The consent order specifies circumstances in which Google must 
provide the potential licensee with a written offer to enter into binding 
arbitration.136 
Of course, the consent order does not bind owners of standard-essential 
patents other than Google. But an implementer may cite the FTC’s position 
when trying to defeat a request for injunctive relief if sued for infringing a 
RAND-encumbered patent. 
E. Injunctive Relief as a Remedy for Infringement in ITC Proceedings 
Almost all tribunals that have considered the propriety of injunctive relief 
for standard-essential patents have concluded that injunctive relief conflicts with 
a patentee’s RAND commitment. But the ITC has not. In an investigation 
involving Samsung (complainant) and Apple (respondent) under section 337 of 
the 1930 Tariff Act, Samsung asserted that certain iPhone, iPod, and iPad 
devices infringed four of its patents.137 The administrative law judge issued an 
initial determination finding that the Apple devices did not infringe any of the 
asserted patents.138 
The Commission decided to review the initial determination in its 
entirety.139 After that review, the Commission ruled that some Apple devices 
infringed one of the asserted patents, in particular, a standard-essential patent.140 
Samsung had declared that patent essential to a telecommunications standard for 
cellular networks and had committed to license it on RAND terms.141 Despite 
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Samsung’s RAND commitment, the Commission concluded that Apple failed to 
prove (1) the existence of a license as an affirmative defense, and (2) that 
Samsung acted unreasonably when negotiating with Apple.142 The Commission 
determined that the Tariff Act’s public-interest factors did not preclude 
injunctive relief.143 Hence, the Commission decided to issue (1) an exclusion 
order preventing Apple from importing infringing devices and (2) a cease-and-
desist order preventing Apple from selling infringing devices already 
imported.144 One commissioner dissented from that decision based on the Tariff 
Act’s public-interest factors.145 
Under the Tariff Act, the President engages in a policy evaluation of an 
ITC decision to issue injunctive relief.146 Within sixty days after the ITC issues 
an order, the President may disapprove—or veto—the order for policy 
reasons.147 The President has delegated that authority to the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR).148 
In the investigation involving Samsung and Apple, the USTR sent the 
ITC a letter that disapproved the ITC’s orders regarding Apple’s infringing 
devices.149 Among other things, the USTR discussed the policy considerations 
set forth in section 337 and its legislative history, such as public welfare, 
competition, and consumers in the United States.150 The USTR also discussed 
the DOJ-PTO policy statement concerning RAND-encumbered patents.151 That 
policy statement noted that voluntary-consensus standards have become 
increasingly important and serve the public interest in many ways, such as 
efficient resource allocation.152 That policy statement also noted that a patentee’s 
RAND commitment could make injunctive relief inconsistent with the public 
interest and harm competition and consumers, e.g., where a patentee employs 
the threat of injunctive relief to pressure an implementer to accept onerous 
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licensing terms.153 The USTR agreed that the threat of injunctive relief could 
permit a patentee to gain “undue leverage” and engage in patent hold-up.154 
The USTR explained that the disapproval rested on a “review of the 
various policy considerations discussed above as they relate to the effect on 
competitive conditions in the U.S. economy and the effect on U.S. 
consumers.”155 The USTR apparently agrees with the DOJ-PTO position that the 
public interest should preclude injunctive relief where the infringer (1) acted 
within the scope of the patentee’s RAND commitment and (2) is willing and 
able to license on RAND terms.156 But if the infringer refuses to accept a license 
on RAND terms, e.g., as determined by a court, the public interest would not 
preclude injunctive relief.157 Further, injunctive relief in an ITC proceeding 
“could be appropriate if a putative licensee is not subject to the jurisdiction of a 
court that could award damages.”158 
After explaining the basis for the disapproval, the USTR advised the ITC 
that in future cases involving RAND-encumbered patents, the ITC should (1) 
“thoroughly and carefully” consider public-interest issues and (2) “have the 
parties develop a comprehensive factual record” related to those issues.159 That 
advice coupled with the USTR’s disapproval of the ITC’s orders should 
decrease the ITC’s attractiveness as a forum for owners of standard-essential 
patents. 
Nevertheless, the ITC usually grants injunctive relief to a prevailing 
patentee, e.g., an exclusion order barring infringing products from entry into the 
United States or a cease-and-desist order directing an infringer to discontinue 
infringing activities in the United States.160 Thus, owners of non-standard-
essential patents should still expect injunctive relief if they prevail at the ITC 
because those patents do not implicate the same public-interest and competition 
concerns as standard-essential patents. 
The USTR’s position on RAND-encumbered patents may cause the ITC 
to determine royalty rates, which it typically does not do since it does not decide 
patent-infringement damages.161 For instance, in a section 337 investigation 
involving Ericsson (complainant) and Samsung (respondent), Ericsson owned 
  
 153 Id. at 6. 
 154 USTR Letter, supra note 149, at 2. 
 155 Id. at 3. 
 156 DOJ-PTO POLICY, supra note 5, at 9. 
 157 USTR Letter, supra note 149, at 2 n.3; DOJ-PTO POLICY, supra note 5, at 7; see 
Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. 12-3451, 2013 WL 2181717, at *7 (N.D. 
Cal. May 20, 2013); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913–14 (N.D. Ill. 
2012). 
 158 USTR Letter, supra note 149, at 2 n.3; DOJ-PTO POLICY, supra note 5, at 7. 
 159 USTR Letter, supra note 149, at 3. 
 160 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(d)–(g) (2012). 
 161 See id. 
 





several standard-essential patents and cited the USTR’s letter within two weeks 
after the USTR sent it.162 In particular, Ericsson relied on the USTR’s letter 
when asking the ITC to determine RAND terms for its standard-essential patents 
so that the ITC could make injunctive relief conditional on Samsung’s refusal to 
accept a license on RAND terms.163 
Samsung responded to Ericsson’s request by asserting, among other 
things, that the ITC lacks jurisdiction to determine binding RAND terms and 
that even if the ITC had jurisdiction, that determination would require a 
substantially different evidentiary record than the existing record.164 Samsung 
argued, however, that the USTR’s letter had an important impact on Ericsson 
because the letter’s reasons for vetoing injunctive relief also applied to 
Ericsson’s standard-essential patents so that Ericsson could not obtain injunctive 
relief.165 Hence, Samsung proposed termination of the investigation in favor of a 
concurrent district court case involving the same RAND issues.166 
The ITC has not yet acted on Ericsson’s request. 
CONCLUSION 
Different SSOs may have policies concerning standard-essential patents 
that differ significantly, even to the point of expressly prohibiting patentees from 
seeking injunctive relief.167 In view of the recent decisions discussed above, an 
owner of a RAND-encumbered patent should thoroughly analyze its RAND 
commitment before filing a complaint with the ITC or requesting injunctive 
relief from a district court. Before taking either action, a patentee should study 
the SSO’s policies to determine (1) whether the SSO prohibits seeking 
injunctive relief and (2) whether the commitment applies to every claim in a 
RAND-encumbered patent or just the essential claims. If the patentee believes 
that injunctive relief is available for nonessential claims, it should carefully 
analyze the infringement issues for those claims. By definition, an accused 
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product or process does not necessarily incorporate the technology covered by 
nonessential claims. Thus, for nonessential claims, an infringement assertion 
should rest on something more than the contention that the accused product 
infringes because it practices the standard at issue. Otherwise, the patentee takes 
a risk that an alleged infringer will claim a violation of Rule 11 for the patentee 
asserting nonessential claims.168 
Also, before filing a complaint with the ITC or requesting injunctive 
relief from a district court, the patentee should make a good-faith license offer. 
An initial license offer that proposes an unreasonable rate may expose the 
patentee to breach-of-contract damages. 
In the event of litigation, the patentee should continue to negotiate license 
terms in good faith. And in an ITC proceeding, the patentee should marshal 
evidence that public-policy considerations, e.g., as set forth in section 337 and 
its legislative history, favor injunctive relief. 
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